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Notes on Raising and Allocating Central Government Revenues 
L. G. Reynolds 
These are working notes intended to raise research problems rather than to 
present new findings. They rest partly on a canvass of the literature, partly on discussions 
with fiscal and planning officials in a considerable number of LDC' s. I am concerned only 
with central government finance, not with the problems which arise in a few of the larger 
LDC's with federal systems. I shall touch briefly on the objectives of fiscal policy, the 
design of public revenues, the facts of revenue-expenditure behavior, problems of the 
capital account, and mechanisms for revenue allocation. 
1. Objectives of fiscal policy 
It is sometimes said that the study of economic development is simply an 
extension of familiar branches of applied economics, such as agricultural economics or 
international economics, to a new spectrum of economies. There is something to this. 
But it is at best a half-truth, and public finance provides a good illustration. Anyone 
reared on the Western public finance literature must re-think his subject substantially to 
cope with the economic structure and policy priorities of the LDC' s. 
First, the relative importance of the various fiscal functions is substantially 
different. Using Musgrave' s threefold schema, the distributional and (probably) the 
stabilization functions are relatively less important in the LDC' s than in the MDC' s. On 
the other hand, the incentive functions, the resource enlargement functions, and the 
allocative functions of the fiscal system are substantially more important. (Musgrave, 
incidentally, does not distinguish promotion of growth as a separate fiscal objective. It 
should perhaps be so distinguished for present purposes.) 
Plan documents and Finance Ministry officials often seem to be saying that the 
purpose of the fiscal system is simply to raise revenue. This is a myopic view. Taxes and 
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expenditures have strong feedback effects on the private sector, as Hymer and Resnick 
correctly point out. The financing of the public sector is not a separable problem, which 
can be carved out neatly from the rest of the economy. It is an inextricable part of the larger 
problem of moving the whole economy forward through time in a desired manner. 
The fiscal system should be viewed first and foremost as a regulatory 
mechanism, 1 a way of paying people for doing (and penalizing them for not doing) things 
which are in the general economic interest. In each area of taxation, incentive and alloca-
tive effects should be in the forefront of attention, revenue yields in the background. Revenm 
requirements can of course not be ignored. But very often the same revenue yield can be 
obtained from a variety of tax structures whose allocative effects are quite different, and 
among which choice can be made on allocative grounds. 
One of the striking things about Western public finance is that we still know 
remarkably little about how different tax structures affect the economic decisions of 
individuals and business concerns. Fresh investigation of these matters in the LDC I s would 
strengthen the general body of economic knowledge, in addition to its policy usefulness 
within the LDC' s. 
The main focus of tax studies should probably be on taxes which bulk large in 
the fiscal systems of the LDC I s. Personal and corporate income taxes will doubtless 
increase gradually in importance. For the time being, however, the most interesting areas 
seem to be: 
(1) Land taxes and other taxes on agricultural income. The literature here is 
very thin and practice is highly unsatisfactory; 
1 For a good statement of this view, with some applications to Pakistan, see Stephen R. 
Lewis, Jr., "Aspects of fiscal policy and resource mobilization in Pakistan, 11 Pakistan 
Development Review, Summer 1964. 
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(Z) Export and import ta}:ation, including tax-like devices such as marketing 
schemes and exchange centrals. Here again it is clear that past practice has had erratic 
and even perverse economic results. 
(3) Excises a.nd other commodity taxes which are bound to be important at an 
early stage of politico-economic development_. and which even in principle may not be as 
inferior as has sometimes been supposed. 
_?. _ ..'J:'he de si.9..:n of public revenues 
Havin:;; said tlTJ.t the fiscal system should not be regarded raainly as a way of 
raising revenues, we novv reverse ourselvas to consider its revenue aspect. Assume for 
the mome1:1t ttat government expenditure will rise relative to national income in a growing 
econo:r.y... What problems are involved in devising a fiscal system which will keep 
revenues in line v,ifo expenditures? Such a system, in which revenues also rise faster 
than national income, we sh~J.l term elastic. Conversely, a system whose yield rises less 
l 
rapidly than national incorr.e, is_i:.!If~lastic, -
On2 must dist!n9T1ish~x ante elasticity from ex e_ost elasticity. A fiscal system 
is elastic ex ant~ if revenues rise faster than national income with no change in the 
number of taxes, the definition of the base for each tax, or the rate schedule for each tax. 
Even if the system i.s belc:stic in this sense, it: can be made elastic ~_12ost by adding new 
taxes, changing tax b1.ses and rate structures, or imprnving the ratio of taxes collected to 
taxes due. Most countries do all these things in varying degree. But frequent tinkering 
with the tax structure hc1s disadvantages. The need for yea.r-to-year patchwork measures 
can be reduced by comprehensive revievr and redesign of the tax system so that it will 
have the desired degree of elasticity ex ~nte, 
1 Note that these definitions arc not unambiguous; for they may relate to government 
revenue relative to tot::1.l income in the economy, or to monetized income only. Monetized 
income presumably rises faster than total income as development proceeds. So a system 
which is inelastic ·with respect to monetized income may still be elastic as regards total 
income. 
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The ex ante elasticity of a particular tax depends, first on the elasticity of the 
base on which the tax is assessed and, second, on the rate schedule. A progressive rate 
schedule can make the yield of a tax elastic even though its base is not. Since the 
elasticity of particular taxes varies, the elasticity of the enUr.e sys-Gem depends on the 
tax mix. 
Estimates of ex ante elasticity at a particular time and place require projections 
of national output and its main components. The income side of the accounts must be 
developed in enough detail to separate out, for example, agricultural income, profit income, 
and wage-salary income; and preferably to permit estimates of income distribution by size­
classes. Given this, tax base behavior can be projected for each tax; and this, in con-
junction with rate schedules, permits a projection of tax yields. 
1 
Published estimates of this kind are rare. One may surmise that they would 
often show revenues to be inelastic ex ante, mainly because most LDC's rely so heavily on 
commodity taxes, export and import taxes, and primitive forms of land taxation. This 
presents an obvious problem of fiscal re-design. 
As a basis for such re-design, one needs further estimates of the consequences 
of changing tax base definitions, changing rate structures, adding new taxes, and so on. 
From this, one can develop a picture of a reformed tax system which would have the degree 
2
of elasticity deemed necessary--!. 1, or 1. 2, or whatever. One can, in fact, develop a 
1 For one careful study, originally a Yale Ph.Dthesis, see Dharam P. Ghai, Taxation for 
Development: A Case Study of Uganda, Nairobi, East Africa Publishing House, 1966. 
2Actual ex post elasticities, achieved partly by trimming and patching are perhaps of the 
order of 1. 3. Williamson found a revenue elasticity of 1. 29 relative to GNP. Thorn found 
an expenditure elasticity of 1. 3. These were cross-section studies, however, and covered 
a wide range of incomes up to and including the United States. Further analysis is clearly 
necessary to reach any firm conclusions for the LDC' s proper. 
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variety of "tax packages," each of which would show the desired behavior of revenues. 
Choice among these would depend on the non-revenue considerations emphasized in the 
preceding section. 
3. Revenue-expenditure behavior 
There has been a good deal of quantitative analysis of government revenues 
and expenditures, kicked off by the Lewis-Martin paper a decade ago, and continuing 
1through more recent studies by Hinrichs, Stephen Lewis, Thorn, and others. This is also 
a favorite topic for analysis in publications of the U. N. regional economic commissions. 
There is still much that is unknown, however, and some of the past work 
appears rather confused. It is common, for example, to make international comparisons of 
government outlays including transfer payments. Exhaustive expenditures, however, would 
seem to be the proper measure of public output. Transfer payments, as a percentage of 
2
GNP, are much larger in the MDC's than in the LDC's. Thus shifting to an exhaustive 
expenditure basis considerably reduces the gap between MDC's and LDC's. If transfer 
payments are excluded, Thorn finds that, in countries with per capita income above $1,200, 
government expenditures average 20. 6 percent of GNP. For countries with per capita 
incomes below $200, the figure is 14. 9 percent. About half of this gap arises from heavier 
defense expenditures in the high-income countries. 
1 Harley H. Hinrichs, "Determinants of government revenue shares among less developed 
countries," Economic Journal, September 1965; Stephen R. Lewis, Jr., "Government revenue 
from foreign trade: an international comparison, " Manchester School, January 1963; 
Richard S. Thorn, "The evolution of public finances during economic development, " 
Manchester School, January 1967; U. Tun ·wai, "Taxation problems and policies of under­
developed countries," IMF Staff Papers, November 1962; Jeffery G. Vl/illiamson, "Public 
expenditure and revenue: an international comparison, " Manchester School, January 1961. 
Thorn finds that transfers to households average 6. 7 percent of GNP for countries with per 
capita income of $1, 200 or more, but only 1. 0 percent of GNP for countries with per capita 
income of $200 or less. 
2 
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The commonest kind of study has been cross-section analysis of countries at all 
levels of income, from Uganda to the United States; and certain standard relations are found. 
Even after all reasonable corrections, the richer countries raise and spend a higher propor­
tion of GNP than the poor countries, they get a larger proportion of their revenues from 
direct taxation, and so on. But some of the studies yield rather unexpected results. For 
example, Hinrich's regression analysis for sixty countries shows a strong relation between 
tax revenue as a percent of GNP (R/Y) and per capita income (Y/N) for the group as a whole. 
When the countries are stratified by income-level, however, there is no significant relation 
between R/Y and Y/N within the group of countries with Y/N of $300 and below, or within 
the group with Y/N of $750 and above. Only in the intermediate group, with Y/N of $300-
$750, does the relation remain. 
For the poorest group of countries, there is a significant relation between R/Y 
and the openness of the economy, as indicated by M/Y. The apparent lack of a relation 
with Y/N may mean either that there is no relation, or that the relation is obscured by poor 
measurements of GNP. 
These cross-section results clearly need to be complemented by analyzing the 
behavior of R/Y in individual LDC' s over extended periods of time. As more of the EGG 
country studies are completed, this sort of comparative analysis will become increasingly 
feasible. 
In addition to analyzing government revenues and expenditures in toto, it would 
seem profitable to analyze each major category of expenditure separately. Each type of 
expenditure probably has its own laws of motion. It is plausible to hypothesize an income 
elasticity of demand for education. But it is not so clear why there should be an elasticity 
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of demand for defense, Some expenditure categories may reflect officials' preferences
1 
rather than citizens' preferences., So it seems desirable to analyze separately the 
determinants of expenditure on defense, urban services, education, health, and so on. 
These may turn out to behave rather differently with respect to national income and other 
. 2
variables. 
4. The Capital Account; Government Saving 
Here one must distinguish between general government and_ the public sector, 
including public enterprises. The economics of public enterprises is a large subject, 
including such problems as pricing policy, profit calculations and _profit targets, invest-
ment policy, and sources of investment finance. w·e leave these issues aside and con­
sider the capital account of general government, public enterprises entering only insofar 
as they contribnte profits or require subsidies. 
Government saving out of current revenue is usually expected to be an important 
source of capital formation in the LDC's. Performance on this front is viewed by aid 
agencies as an important indicator of "self--help." But the usual measures of saving have 
a large conventional element. This is so because the definition of current expenditure, 
1 There is a growing body of literature on the economics of the large corporation, which 
attempts to specify managers' preferences in a way amenable to statistical tests. See, 
for example, J. E. W"illiamson, "Managerial discretion and business behavior," 
American Economic Review, December 1963; R, J. Monsen, Jr. and Anthony Downs, "A 
theory of large managerial firms," Journal of PoU.tical Economy, June 1965. There is also 
a considerable lit(c!rature on "planners' preferences" in Soviet-type economies; which may 
have some relevance to government decision-making in the LDC' s. 
2 see on this point Frederic Pryor' s comparison of selected expenditure items in a half­
dozen capitalist and socialist countries. He found it necessary to tailor a separate theory 
for each item; and he found also that a country's economic system was less significant 
than per capita income and other conventional variables. (British edition: Allen and 
Unwin, 1968; American edition, Richard D. Irwin, 1968). 
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which is subtracted from current revenue to get the savings figure, is itself conventional. 
The conventions may vary considerably from country to country. Moreover, part of what is 
counted as current expenditure resembles physical capital formation in contributing to 
higher output in future years (for example, research, part of educational expenditure, part 
of public health expenditure). Thus it is possible that country A, which has a lower 
government saving ratio than country B, may actually be spending more in productivity­
raising directions. 
Waiving this difficulty, it would be useful to examine the behavior of 
conventionally-defined average and marginal savings rates in a variety of LDC' s. The 
targets in development plans are usually ambitious, often specifying a marginal savings 
rate well above pa st average performance. What does such a marginal rate mean? It is 
not a built-in characteristic of the system, derived from supposedly stable functions, like 
the marginal propensity to consume, or the marginal revenue yield from a given tax 
structure. Viewed ex ante, it is an expression of intent. Viewed (more significantly) 
ex post, it is an indicator of revenue performance and of government's success in resisting 
demands for current expenditure. 
The difficulty of increasing, or even maintaini_ng, the average savings rate is 
obvious-. The army and the police are powerful claimants for any increase in current 
revenues. Beyond this, government is usually under pressure to raise salaries year by 
year. Since salaries constitute the bulk of current expenditure, the rate of salary increase 
is critically important. If the elasticity of the revenue system is near unity, but the rate 
of salary increase is substantially above the rate of GNP increase, any margin for govern­
ment saving will be eroded over time. 
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Houthakker concludes, from a cross-section analysis of 28 countries ranging in 
income from the U. S. A. to the Republic of the Congo, that the percentage of current revenue 
saved is about the same at all income levels. 1 More surprisingly, Thorn's cross-section 
study finds that the percentage of current revenue saved is substantially higher in the low­
income countries. 2 Eliminating transfer payments would reduce the difference but would by 
no means eliminate it. The two studies appear contradictory, and neither result is what one 
might hq,ve expected a priori. This suggests a need for further study. Specifically, it 
would be useful to have time-series analyses for as many LDC's as possible, over as long 
a period as possible. 
The anslysis should of course go beyond government saving to include other items 
on the resources side of the capital account: transfers from public enterprises, domestic 
borrowing, foreign borrowing, money creation. The behavior over time of government 
capital formation, and of these main sources of finance, would be highly interesting. An 
even broader undertaking would be to trace the behavior of "development expenditure, 11 
whether or not directed toward physical capital formation, and the sources of finance for 
such expenditure. The concept of development expenditure is fuzzy, however, and its 
content varies from country to country. So while experimentation in this direction would be 
useful, one might or might not get significant results. 
1 His relation is s90v = O. 107 G 
(0. 014) 
where G is current revenue per capita and Sgov is government saving per capita. H. S. 
Houthakker, "On some determinants of saving in developed and underdeveloped countries," 
in E. A. G. Robinson (ed.) Problems in Economic Development (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1965), pp. 212-30. 
For countries with per capita income above $1,200, current revenue averages 27. 3 percent 
of GNP, and government saving 3 percent of GNP, i.e. government saving is about one-ninth 
of revenue. For countries with per capita income below $200, the corresponding figures are 
15. 9 percent and 3. 2 percent, i.e. government saving is one-fifth of revenue. 
2 
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5. Revenue Allocation: Planning and Budgeting 
Much of the development literature implies that, H only enough revenue can be 
raised, efficient allocation can be taken for granted. Somewhere in the government 
apparatus there is assumed to be a coordinator, who has enough knowledge to equate cost­
benefit ratios at the margin and enough authority to direct expenditures accordingly. 
This is of course not an accurate picture even in the relatively well-organized 
American government. Our annual budget review concentrates on increments to existing 
1 
programs. Just as old taxes are said to be good taxes, old expenditures are presumed to 
be warranted. Action on the increments also leaves much to be desired. The good 
economists in the Bureau of the Budget are not able to accomplish many things which 
technical analysis suggests should be done. 2 
Allocation difficulties are even more serious in the LDC's. In most countries, 
the Minister of Finance is traditionally a powerful figure. He collects revenues, and 
authorizes release of funds for expenditure. He prepares estimates of future revenue, 
which presents obvious possibilities of gamesmanship. If there is an organization to 
review departmental requests, a budget bureau, it is also traditionally located in the 
Ministry of Finance. Allocations are decided by negotiations between the Minister con-
cerned, the Finance Minister, and on large matters the Prime Minister or President. They 
are influenced by the aggressiveness and bargaining positions of individual ministers, and 
also by the strength of their technical staffs. There may or may not be any serious 
1 It can be argued, of course, that this will yield correct results if done carefully and over 
a sufficiently long period. If the budget is growing over time, and if increments are 
correctly managed, totals will come out about right. It can also be argued that, given the 
limitations of knowledge in the hands of a central decision-maker, simultaneous reconsider­
ation of the whole expenditure pattern is unfeasible, and "incremental decision-making" 
will yield superior results. This line of thought has been well developed by Lindblom and 
others. 
2 For a sophisticated and entertaining analysis of U.S. federal budget making, see Aaron 
Wildovsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964). 
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legislative review. In the Philippines, for example, it is customary for the legislature to 
approve expenditure proposals far in excess of prospective revenues. Which projects are 
actually undertaken is then decided within the executive branch. 
Planning organizations are relatively new agencies grafted onto this pre-
existing framework. The main operational problem of a planning agency is to insert itself 
into the mainstream of budget decisions, an effort which is likely to be resisted by the 
Finance Minister and others, and which cannot succeed without top-level support. To the 
extent that the effort is successful, however, the planning group may be able to improve 1 
allocative procedures in several ways: 
(1) Urging {and training) the various departments to prepare better project 
designs and more careful budget justifications. 
(2) Requiring departments to project their spending requirements for some years 
in the future. This is obviously necessary for multi-year capital construction projects, but 
it is desirable for every kind of expenditure. Capital expenditures normally generate a 
stream of current operating expenditure for future years, which must be considered in 
longer-range planning. 
{3} Accomplishing a separation between "developmental" and other expenditures. 
The economic justification for such a division is not too clear, but it can be a useful 
strategic device. Since development is "good II by definition, listing an item on the 
development side of the budget probably makes it more likely that funds will be forthcoming. 
Moreover, since the planning agency is the special guardian of the development budget, 
1 This is a tendentious word, perhaps indicating no more than an economist's bias toward 
considering it "good" that more economists should be involved in budget making and that 
economic criteria for allocation should be given greater weight. 
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increasing the relative size of that budget tends to increase the planners' influence in 
budget making. 
A common arrangement is that the planning organization revisw,a all develop­
ment expenditures, while other expenditures are reviewed by a budget agency in the 
Finance Ministry or elsewhere. This is of course an ambiguous arrangement. To the 
extent that the Finance Ministry, the Defense Ministry, etc. determine the size of the 
"regular11 budget, they also determine how much is available for development. But while 
separate authority over the development budget is not a guarantee that development needs 
will have high priority, it is useful in strengthening the bargaining position of the planning 
group. 
(t:1) Improving the annual allocation decisions by achieving greater year-to-year 
consistency, better inter-departmental coordination of projects (for example, on a regional 
basis), and by relating specific expenditure items to general development strategy. 
(5) Installing systematic follow-up on project execution rates, and on 
deviations of actual from budgeted expenditures. Knowing what happened last year is 
obviously helpful. in budgeting for next year, but this simple requirement is often neglected 
in practice. 
This is a proper, indeed a necessary, area of research for economists. To 
paraphrase a famous saying, "Government is too important to be left to students of govern­
ment. 11 Different budgetary procedures have different allocative results, and can make a 
substantial difference to the current efficiency and future growth rate of the economy. 
Specialists in public administration tend, I think, to regard governmental organization as 
almost an end in itself, a self-contained object of study. To the economist, organization 
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is instrumental, and the interesting question is how well it serves efficiency goals which 
we can define with some precision. It would be useful to have country-by-country studies, 
not of budgeting machinery per se, but of the allocations which come out of the budget 
procedure, and of the apparent relation between procedure and results. Only economists, 
so far as I can see, are likely to do sophisticated work of this sort. 
